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Abstract
Do governments’ military build-ups foster the outbreak of intrastate violence? This article investigates the impact of
governments’ arms imports on the onset of intrastate conflicts. There is scant empirical research on the role of the
external acquisition of coercive technologies, and even fewer studies explore the respective causal mechanisms of
their consequences. We argue that the existing literature has not adequately considered the potential simultaneity
between conflict initiation and arms purchases. In contrast, our study explicitly takes into account that weapon
inflows may not only causally induce conflicts but may themselves be caused by conflict anticipation. Following a
review of applicable theoretical models to derive our empirical expectations, we offer two innovative approaches to
surmount this serious endogeneity problem. First, we employ a simultaneous equations model that allows us to
estimate the concurrent effects of both arms imports on conflict onsets and conflict onsets on imports. Second, we
are the first to use an instrumental variable approach that uses the import of weapon types not suitable for intrastate
conflict as instruments for weapon imports that are relevant for fighting in civil wars. Relying on arms transfer data
provided by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute for the period 1949-2013, we provide estimates
for the effect of imports on civil war onset. Our empirical results clearly show that while arms imports are not a
genuine cause of intrastate conflicts, they significantly increase the probability of an onset in countries where
conditions are notoriously conducive to conflict. In such situations, arms are not an effective deterrent but rather
spark conflict escalation.
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Introduction
Weapons constitute the non-sufficient but necessary
input technology for conflict (see Hirshleifer, 2000).
The coercive capacity of incumbent governments and
their effective control over a state’s territory against inter-
nal and external challengers relies essentially on the
availability of arms. This is an important aspect, which
the extensive literature on intrastate conflict onsets
(recent reviews include Dixon, 2009; Blattman &
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Miguel, 2010) has largely neglected so far.1 As only few
countries are able to produce modern conventional
weapons systems (see Thurner et al., forthcoming), most
countries have to import them. This raises serious ques-
tions. What is the role of governments’ external arms
acquisition for intrastate crisis bargaining and escalation?
Do they play a causal role in intrastate conflicts?
Looking selectively at historical examples does not
provide conclusive answers. There are cases where large
arms imports preceded the outbreak of a conflict (e.g.
Angola: 1975 and 1998) but also cases where only small
or no inflows of arms occurred before a conflict onset
(e.g. Liberia: 1989 and 2000). At the same time, there
are instances where we observe large arms imports but no
civil war (e.g. Libya: 1974–83, United Arab Emirates:
2004–13). Therefore, a fresh look at the consequences of
international weapon flows is of practical relevance. The
creation of the United Nation’s Arms Trade Treaty in
2013 shows that the international community is well
aware of the potential risks of an uncontrolled interna-
tional arms trade. Knowledge of whether the availability
of major conventional weapon systems to incumbent
governments increases or decreases the risk of intrastate
conflict would be therefore of major importance for con-
flict prevention.
Quantitative empirical research has been almost silent
on the impact of arms imports. The (very) few studies
that do exist offer no clear theoretical account of how
weapon deliveries could affect the initiation of intrastate
conflicts, and they arrive at contradicting empirical con-
clusions. We argue that this is most likely due to the fact
that when studying the relationship between conflicts
and the acquisition of arms, one is faced with the prob-
lem of a potential simultaneity between the emergence of
conflict and arms procurement: weapon imports (just as
military expenditures) may not only have a causal influ-
ence on conflict probability, but perceived and antici-
pated conflict itself could causally influence
governments’ inclinations to purchase arms. The result-
ing endogeneity makes any theoretical as well as statisti-
cal analysis challenging. In our view, this problem has
not been appropriately dealt with in previous research.
Previous research on arms and intrastate conflicts has
also not offered many theoretical rationales for why there
should be a causal link between weapon transfers and
conflict onset. We accentuate the fundamental insight
that scholars of interstate wars have long recognized (see
Diehl, 1983): conflicts do not predominantly arise over
arms, they arise first and foremost over contested issues.
We argue that only the proper control of the established
conflict incentives and opportunities allows us to identify
whether arms imports have a causal influence on conflict.
Bearing this caveat in mind, we explore several relevant
approaches. In particular, we look at (i) arguments about
how the availability of arms may change policymakers’
willingness to use them (e.g. Fordham, 2004); (ii) how
arms inflows could be perceived as signals about a gov-
ernment’s resolve or its military capabilities in the frame-
work of well-established crisis bargaining models (e.g.
Powell, 2006; Walter, 2009a, b), and (iii) how invest-
ment in arms may affect different types of state capacities
and thus make conflict more or less likely (e.g. Fearon &
Laitin, 2003; Besley & Persson, 2011). While arguments
about deterrence and signalling might suggest a negative
relationship between imports and conflict probability, a
number of other mechanisms point in the opposite
direction. Under high conflict-risk conditions, govern-
ments and opposition groups have strong incentives to
initiate violence due to various pre-emptive motives or to
solve collective action problems in situations of highly
asymmetric military endowments. Furthermore, a lack of
state capacity may also make conflict more likely.
In this article, we analyze major conventional weap-
ons (MCW) and their import by governments. This
makes sense as MCWs are regularly deployed by the state
in civil wars (see Kalyvas & Balcells, 2010). There are
two objections that could be raised against this particular
focus, however. First, small arms and light weapons
(SALW) are also an essential conflict technology in civil
wars. Second, looking only at governments neglects the
fact that rebel groups may also import arms which could
in turn affect intrastate conflicts. With respect to the first
point, it would indeed be optimal to simultaneously
analyze both MCW and SALW transfers. However,
existing data series on SALW transfers are much shorter
(starting only in the 1990s) and less consistent than for
MCW trades. Furthermore, there is no reason to believe
a priori that conflict dynamics induced by both weapon
classes are similar. Governments often have a monopoly
on MCW before a conflict outbreak. Thus, they are a
potentially visible signal of a state’s resolve and military
capabilities. Hence, it does make sense to analyze the
effects of MCW and SALW separately. Regarding the
second objection, transfers to rebel groups are generally
much more secretive than government purchases and
probably only a highly biased subset of these transactions
1 Note that there is a more recent literature which relates conflict
technologies and external support of rebel groups to conflict intensity
and duration, see Balcells & Kalyvas (2014); Sawyer, Gallagher
Cunningham & Reed (2015).
Pamp et al. 431
appears in our data. As a result, we have much less reli-
able data on exports to rebels and expect systematic
measurement errors to be a huge problem.2 Moreover,
governments are the main recipients of major conven-
tional weapons (MCW) prior to a conflict outbreak.
Observable arms flows are therefore predominantly
going to governments (although this often changes after
a civil war begins).
We are able to draw on an extensive dataset of 137
countries for the period 1949–2013. Our empirical
analysis finds a clear positive effect of MCW imports
on the probability of intrastate conflict onset. This effect
is particularly large for high-risk countries, that is, for
countries in which conflict-inducing conditions, as out-
lined by the literature, are present. This leads us to con-
clude that arms imports in these situations do not serve
as an effective deterrent by governments but contribute
to conflict escalation and thus the outbreak of civil war.
In the following, we will first provide a short overview
of the sparse quantitative literature investigating the cor-
relation between weapons imports and intrastate con-
flict. We then outline our theoretical arguments for
deriving our empirical expectations. Before proceeding
with our statistical analysis, we discuss how our econo-
metric structural equation and instrumental variable
approaches help surmount the endogeneity problem.
This is followed by a discussion of our empirical results
and a number of robustness tests. The final section offers
a brief summary and concluding remarks.
The role of arms imports in the literature
Research on arms transfers and domestic conflicts is
scarce. A comprehensive review of empirical findings for
about 200 variables by Dixon (2009) mentions arms
trade only briefly as belonging to the group of negligible,
non-significant factors. The few publications that do
investigate the role of arms trade on intrastate war arrive
at diverging conclusions. Some studies indicate that arms
imports have no effect on the outbreak of internal con-
flicts. Craft (1999) investigates the link between arms
and inter- and intrastate wars at the systemic level
between 1945 and 1992. He finds a positive relationship
between the total value of transferred MCWs and the
number of ongoing conflicts, but no meaningful correla-
tion between arms transfers and the outbreak of con-
flicts. Durch (2000) investigates interstate and
intrastate wars separately and analyzes the role of arms
deliveries for 106 developing states between 1970 and
1995. His results suggest that arms transfers may facil-
itate the outbreak of external wars but do not affect the
risk of internal wars. The most distinct rejection of a link
between arms transfers and the outbreak of civil conflict
comes from Suzuki (2007). He regresses the outbreak of
civil and ethnic conflicts on arms imports in a pooled
regression covering 100 states between 1956 to 1998
and finds no statistically significant links.
Other studies, by contrast, suggest that arms contrib-
ute to the outbreak of civil conflicts. Based on a pooled
regression analysis, Craft & Smaldone (2002) find that
arms imports are a significant predictor of civil war inci-
dence in sub-Saharan Africa (1967 to 1997). Blanton
(1999) reports a robust link between country-level arms
imports and political repression and infers: ‘Arms acqui-
sitions appear to contribute to repression by making
violent political acts more feasible’ (Blanton, 1999:
241). Sislin & Pearson (2001) investigate the role of
arms transfers in ethno-political conflicts. Their main
finding from three in-depth case studies is that arms
acquisition leads to increased violence during conflicts.3
An additional comparison of 133 ethno-political groups
in the 1990s suggests that access to arms may also trigger
rebellion and conflict.
The empirical literature thus leaves us with contra-
dictory results, which may suggest that there simply is no
systematic link between arms imports and civil wars.
However, a definite assessment requires additional the-
oretical and empirical work. Most papers discuss appea-
sement vs. instability in general terms but do not
disentangle the motivations and signals set by arms trans-
fers (e.g. Craft, 1999; Craft & Smaldone, 2002; Suzuki,
2007). We seek to contribute to the debate with a more
detailed discussion of the specific causal implications of
governmental arms imports. Our research is further
motivated by improvements regarding the documenta-
tion of arms transfers over recent years. Some previous
publications relied on less reliable data sources and used
more restricted sample sizes and observation periods.
Finally, a crucial empirical challenge is the problem of
endogeneity and reverse causality. Conflicts may be a
consequence of arms acquisition, yet arms acquisition
may also be the result of the anticipation of conflicts
or conflict risks. This problem has not been sufficiently
taken into account by previous research. Our study
2 Note that the existing external support data by Cunningham &
Salehyan (2009) focuse exclusively on conflict events and provide
only discrete measures of rebel military capacity. 3 See also Moore (2012).
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therefore proposes the use of both instrumental variables
and simultaneous equation modelling.
Exploring theoretical links between intrastate
conflict onset and the import of arms
The existing empirical studies offer almost no theoretical
rationale for their empirical hypotheses. This should
come as no surprise since there are, to our knowledge,
no theoretical models that explicitly consider the causal
influence of arms imports on the onset of violent intra-
state conflicts. To overcome this shortcoming, one can
draw on the rationalist approaches developed for the
explanation of wars (for overviews see Powell, 1999; Levy
& Thompson, 2010; Bueno de Mesquita, 2014). This
includes a growing theoretical literature on militarization
and armament processes in interstate conflicts (e.g. Kydd,
2000; Baliga & Sjo¨stro¨m, 2004; Meirowitz & Sartori,
2008; Jackson & Morelli, 2009). Its assumptions on the
distribution of capabilities and information, commitment
problems and the credibility of signals, as well as the costs
of deterrence and war, have been discussed as major
mechanisms also in the domestic context (for an overview
see Lichbach, 2009). However, systematic, context-
specific theoretical transfers of insights from interstate
war models to domestic conflicts have been rare. The
reason is that intrastate conflicts usually involve a state
and one or more domestic groups. Classical notions of
arms races and strategic mutual armament developed for
interstate dynamics do not always apply here. This is all
the more the case when considering major conventional
weapons. Prior to the outbreak of violence, it is usually
the government that is in control of a country’s MCW
imports. Even if rebel groups prepare for civil war by
illegally obtaining weapons, these are in most cases small
arms and light weapons, which are technically less
demanding and easier to acquire. Rebels often gain access
to MCWs only after conflicts start, mostly through exter-
nal support by third countries or looting (Jackson, 2010).
The following theoretical discussion does not attempt
to develop a new model but rather draws on insights from
the literature on armament, interstate wars and domestic
conflicts. Our basic premise is that conflicts do not arise
over arms, they arise over certain issues that seed the sow
for possible conflicts (Fearon & Laitin, 2003; Collier &
Hoeffler, 2004). If the conditions that create violent con-
flicts are not present, importing arms should not provoke
any violence. In the following, we assume the existence of
a central government and one or more opposition groups
under conflict-inducing conditions.
A government can decide to build up military cap-
abilities by importing MCWs. This can either be in
response to foreign or domestic threats, but it always has
to be balanced against the opportunity costs of not
spending limited resources for other ends (Powell,
1993; Besley & Persson, 2011). For intrastate conflicts,
only weapons that can be used against internal challen-
gers are relevant. The aim of such a purely domestically-
oriented armament process can either be to prepare for a
future conflict onset or to deter domestic challengers by
signalling the government’s resolve and its capabilities to
act militarily. The decision to increase military capabil-
ities could be made in anticipation of a certain conflict
because the government expects violent challenges by
rebels or intends to use force to remove the potential for
any future challenges (Powell, 2013). In this case,
weapon deliveries are positively associated with the ori-
gin of intrastate conflict but are not a causal factor. This
point highlights why taking the enodgeneity of arms
imports seriously is critical in our empirical analysis. The
government is therefore always faced with the strategic
decision of whether to buy arms and whether to initiate a
violent conflict (for an overview see Kydd, 2015: chapter
7). Domestic groups (potential rebels), on the other
hand, can observe arms imports and need to decide
whether to initiate a violent challenge to the government.
They cannot observe the true resolve of a government to
respond militarily to a challenge and they may or may not
be able to observe the state’s true capabilities. This situa-
tion can thus be conceptualized as a repeated strategic
game. In each period, the government determines whether
to import arms and each side decides whether to initiate a
conflict. Since acquiring weapons is costly, the govern-
ment needs to weigh its benefits (successful deterrence
or prevailing in future conflicts) against its opportunity
costs (Powell, 1993). Given this simplified set up, we
discuss how a government’s decision to import MCW
affects the probability of conflict onset.
Arms imports and the feasibility of force
This argument was initially proposed by Most & Starr
(1989) who distinguish between ‘opportunity’ and ‘will-
ingness’. Having military capabilities creates the oppor-
tunity to resolve latent conflicts through the use of force.
But having a military option available does not necessa-
rily mean that a government is willing to use it. Only if
arms imports affect ‘willingness’ should we observe a link
between arms imports and civil war onsets. Hence, any
theoretical account needs to explain why ‘willingness’
could increase with arms inflows. Analyzing the use of
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force in US foreign policy, Fordham (2004: 635) refers
to different arguments why higher military capabilities
may increase policymakers’ ‘willingness’. In particular,
increases in the expected utility of fighting or the
strengthening of hardliners in the government are
offered as possible explanations. His empirical analysis
of US foreign policy finds that military capabilities
indeed increased the frequency with which force was
used (Fordham, 2004: 649–652). In a similar vein, Sislin
& Pearson (2001: 59) argue that in domestic conflicts,
arms increase tension levels and threat perceptions, thus
making violence more feasible. In sum, these arguments
suggest that arms imports increase the willingness of
governments to use force, which makes conflict onset
more likely.
Signalling and deterrence
The situation of a government facing one or more poten-
tial rebel groups can be linked to an entry deterrence
game in economics, where repeated play and private
information about one’s resolve creates strong incentives
for reputation building (Kreps & Wilson, 1982). To
deter rebel groups from posing a violent challenge, the
government has an incentive to gain a reputation to be
resolute and thus willing to meet any challenge to its
authority with the use of force. If successful, such a signal
should discourage challengers and make conflict less
likely. Rebel groups are unable to observe the true resolve
of the government and make inferences based on the
signals they receive. The procurement of MCW by the
government is, of course, such a signal.
There are, however, two important qualifications that
cast serious doubts on this hypothesized negative relation-
ship. First, arms inflow may be interpreted as a signal of
the unwillingness of the government to compromise. This
could accelerate conflict onset if rebels expect their chance
of winning to decrease further in the future. Second, even
if winning the conflict is unlikely, rebels may still wish to
fight. As Walter (2009b: 35) points out, not only are we
unable to distinguish resolute and irresolute governments,
but also there are different levels of commitment by rebel
groups. In particular, there could be groups that are not
prepared to back down from their demands even if a
violent conflict is very unlikely to be won. While in our
view this distinction between resolute and irresolute rebels
is not satisfactory to explain a seemingly irrational wish to
fight a losing battle, an alternative explanation could lead
to the same outcome. Rebel groups may initiate conflict
(or low-level skirmishes such as terrorist attacks) to pro-
voke a government reaction and then use this reaction to
recruit support for their cause (see Lichbach, 1998). This
would in turn increase their chance of winning a conflict.
Attempts to organize and overcome collective action prob-
lems could therefore explain why, despite strong signals of
resolve by the government, rebels may still choose violent
conflict. Thus, onset probability would increase as a
peaceful solution is deemed more unlikely with rising
arms imports.
So far, we have considered arms imports as signals
about a government’s resolve. This should not be con-
flated with signals about military capabilities (Slantchev,
2011: 14). Purchasing weapons could also be an attempt
to signal military strength and the potential to increase
this strength through imports. This again is aimed to
deter challenges and therefore, if successful, should
reduce conflict probability (Huth, 1988; Jervis, 1989).
Again, the opposite effect is also possible. Observing the
ongoing armament of the government may spur rebel
groups to initiate conflict as quickly as possible as
weapon imports may lead to a shift in the distribution
of power. As Powell (2006: 195) has argued, a rapidly
shifting distribution of power may lead to conflict
because an initially weak state cannot promise other
domestic groups that it will not use its increased capabil-
ities in the future to renege on existing peaceful settle-
ments. Furthermore, interstate models of endogenous
armament adapted to the intrastate context suggest that
rebels may decide to fight when the costs of violent
conflict are perceived to be lower relative to the costs
resulting from the power shift towards the government.
If, on the other hand, the state is strong and there is a
large asymmetry in military capabilities, then there could
be predatory motives by the state to initiate military
action. As the model by Chassang & Padro´ i Miquel
(2010) suggests, in this situation conflict is very likely
under complete information or even under incomplete
information if the state has a complete monopoly on
violence. Finally, the government may consider deter-
rence as too costly in the long term and thus decide to
start a violent conflict in order to eliminate the opposi-
tion (Kydd, 2015). In this case, rising arms imports are
temporary and a preparation for domestic war. Note that
this may also lead to cases where, due to incomplete
information, rebels pre-empt the government’s decision
to fight if they cannot distinguish attempts at deterrence
from a government’s preparation to strike first.4
4 As an anonymous referee has correctly pointed out, rebels may also
misinterpret arms imports aimed at foreign enemies to be directed at
them. This could lead either to a sort of accidental deterrence or to
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Arms imports and state capacities
Fearon & Laitin (2003) have argued that it is the weakness
of governments that strongly influences the probability of
civil war. States have different types of capacities to peace-
fully solve domestic conflicts or deal with challenges mili-
tarily (Hendrix, 2010). A very narrow and simple approach
would be to equate state capacity with military and police
capabilities (Fearon & Laitin, 2003; Kalyvas, 2006). Arms
imports increase this type of capacity and should therefore
reduce the probability of violent domestic conflict.
The effect of arms imports is less clearcut when consid-
ering other dimensions of state capacity. Azam (2001)
points to the importance of redistributive capacity. Devel-
oping a game-theoretical model, he argues that in African
cases it is the ability of states to effectively redistribute
resources among different groups and their elites that
reduces the probability of violent conflicts. A more promi-
nent dimension of capacity is fiscal or extractive capacity
(Tilly, 1985; Levi, 1988; Cheibub, 1998). This describes
the ability of countries to efficiently tax their citizens and to
extract natural resources. A high capacity is expected to
lower the potential for violent conflicts. Empirical analyses
have only yieldedmixed results, however, failing to establish
a clearcut inverse relationship between fiscal capacity and
onset probability (Thies, 2010, 2015). Besley & Persson
(2011) have developed a formal model in which govern-
ments make decisions to invest in future state capacity
(fiscal and legal) and in military capabilities. They show
that if political institutions are non-inclusive, decisions by
the government to invest in military capabilities result in
either one-sided political violence (see also Blanton, 1999)
or civil war. Resources spent on the military reduce invest-
ment in future state capacity, which lowers wages and thus
makes war more likely. Intuitively and in more general
terms, resources spent on arms imports lower investment
in conflict reducing (redistributive, fiscal and legal)
capacity-building. It follows that arms imports should
increase the probability of violent intrastate conflict.
Summary of theoretical expectations
Endogeneous armament processes and violent intrastate
conflict are still not fully understood in the domestic con-
text. Adapting existing theoretical approaches to account
for possible arms inflows yields no clearcut predictions.
Arguments from crisis bargaining that stress the impor-
tance of signalling to deter challengers, as well as theories
highlighting the importance of military state capacity,
suggest an inverse relationship between arms transfers and
onset probability. In contrast, a positive effect of weapon
imports on onset probabilities can be deduced from argu-
ments about the feasibility of force, crisis bargaining with
highly committed challengers, numerous incentives for
both sides to initiate pre-emptive attacks and trade-offs
between investing in arms and investing in redistributive,
fiscal and legal state capacity. We provide a synopsis of
these theoretical arguments in Table I.
In the following sections, we aim to conduct a thor-
ough econometric analysis that adequately deals with the
problem of the endogeneity of arms imports. While this is
not intended to be a test of all the models and arguments
introduced in this section, it will allow us to isolate the
aggregate effect of weapon imports.
Table I. Theoretical links between arms imports and intrastate conflict onset
Incentive Causal mechanism Reference
Probability of
onset
Arms imports and feasibility of force
Opportunity and willingness Opportunity increases willingness Fordham (2004) þ
Signalling and deterrence
Signalling resolve Deterrence of challengers Kreps & Wilson (1982) –
Signalling resolve Pre-emptive attack by challengers Lichbach (1998); Walter (2009) þ
Signalling capability Deterrence of challengers Huth (1988); Jervis (1989) –
Signalling capability Pre-emptive attack by challengers Powell (2006) þ
Large asymmetry in capabilities Predatory motive for government to
attack
Chassang & Padro´ i Miquel
(2010)
þ
Deterrence too costly Pre-emptive attack by government Kydd (2015) þ
Arms imports and state capacities
Military state capacity Deterrence of challengers Fearon & Laitin (2003); –
Fiscal, legal, redistributive
capacity
Trade-off arms imports and capacity
building
Besley & Persson (2011) þ
intrastate conflict because rebels may initiate violence because they
erroneously think that the government is preparing for domestic war.
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Data and research design
Data sources and operationalizations
We use an unbalanced panel dataset that covers 137
countries for the years 1949 to 2013. We measure the
beginning of an intrastate conflict as a dummy variable
(Onset) that takes the value 1 if two conditions are met:
(i) in a given year t there are at least 25 deaths related to
an intrastate (ethnic or civil) conflict, and (ii) there has
been no outbreak of the same conflict in t  1 and
t  2.5 Data on intrastate conflicts are from UCDP/
PRIO’s Armed Conflict Dataset 4-2015,6 see Gleditsch
et al. (2002); Melander, Pettersson & Themne´r (2016)).
A particular issue arises with respect to the coding of
ongoing intrastate conflicts. The majority of the empiri-
cal literature sets ongoing conflict years to zero
(McGrath, 2015: 535). As McGrath (2015) shows using
Monte Carlo experiments, this can lead to biased esti-
mates and wrong substantive inferences. We decided
therefore to set ongoing conflict years to missing.
Data on arms imports are provided by the Stockholm
International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). They
cover the trade of major conventional weapons (MCWs),
which do not include weapons of mass destruction and
small arms and light weapons (SALWs). Arms imports are
measured in trend indicator values (TIV) that represent
the known, inflation-adjusted production costs of core
weapon systems measured in millions of constant-1990
US dollars. Hence, what is supposed to be measured is not
the financial value of arms but the volume of military
capabilities that is being transferred. MCWs cover a wide
range of weapon systems, from armoured vehicles to air-
craft and satellites, as well as components such as engines.7
We exploit the fact that not all of these weapon systems
are deployable for intrastate conflicts. For our analysis, we
therefore construct different versions of MCW import
variables: Logimports measures the annual import of arms
types which are presumably of high importance in intra-
state wars (aircraft, armoured vehicles, artillery and mis-
siles); Logimports_unrelated captures the annual import of
arms that are unrelated to intrastate conflicts (air-defence
systems, anti-submarine weapons, satellites and ships).8
Note that only arms deals where the TIV of the traded
weapons is at least 0.5 (i.e. US$500,000) are recorded by
SIPRI. For all of our import variables we have multiplied
this TIV value by 100 and then taken the natural
logarithm.
The drawback of looking at annual figures is that while
SIPRI reports TIV values for the date of delivery, the time
of ordering weapons might already constitute a signal to
rebel groups. To smooth the temporal differences between
order and delivery dates, we created two variables,
Logimports_avg5 and Logimports_avg10, which are 5-year
and 10-year backward moving averages of arms imports.
Conflict onsets and arms imports: Addressing the
endogeneity problem
Analyzing the impact of arms deliveries on the onset of
intrastate conflicts, we are confronted with a problem of
co-determination: arms imports may not only affect con-
flict but could themselves be caused by its outbreak or
the anticipation of such an event in the immediate
future. This is all the more apparent if we conceptualize
conflict onset as a latent, continuous variable. Other
than a binary conflict indicator might suggest, onset is
the consequence of a development in which tensions rise
until a certain threshold is reached. In our case, this
threshold is marked by a certain number of conflict-
related deaths. As a result, a positive correlation between
arms imports and onset could either indicate a causal
effect of weapon deliveries on conflict onset or be a
consequence of the looming outbreak which raises the
demand for weapons. The few empirical studies that do
exist on arms imports and intrastate conflict have, in our
view, not paid sufficient attention to this problem.
We therefore apply a twofold strategy: on the one
hand, we propose an instrument for civil war-related
weapons. On the other hand, we employ a simultaneous
equation model (SEM) as developed by Amemiya
(1978), Heckman (1978) and Maddala (1983). The
instrumental variable framework proceeds in two steps:
first, we predict weapon imports with an instrumental
variable that is related to the import decision (first-stage
relevance), but not to civil war onset (the exclusion
restriction). Second, we use the exogenous variation
induced by the instrument to assess the endogenous
variation9 between imports and civil war (second stage).
We propose to use variation in non-civil war-related5 Note there are instances where there is more than one intrastate
conflict in a country in a given year.
6 See: http://ucdp.uu.se/downloads/
7 See http://www.sipri.org/databases/armstransfers/background/
coverage for more details.
8 ‘Engines’, ‘Sensors’ and the category ‘Other’ were not included in
either variable.
9 An approach taking endogeneity into account is warranted: a Wald
test of exogeneity (see Wooldridge, 2002: 472–475) does not reject
the null of no correlation between the reduced form residuals and the
dependent variable for several models.
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weapons as a suitable instrument for civil war-related
weapons. With rare exceptions (e.g. the naval warfare
in the Sri Lankan civil war), these weapons are
plausibly targeted at external defence and interstate
wars. We argue that the purchase of these weapon
types is due to regional arms races, security concerns
and external threats, but also because of corruption,
military greed and prestige (e.g. Ball, 1993). At the
same time, in order to sustain a balanced military
portfolio, governments tend to purchase other major
conventional weapons that are deployable in a civil
war. This latter part of our argument is testable: the
correlation between both types is strong. We report
the first stage regression results in Online appendix
Table A.3: an increase in Logimports_unrelated leads to
a substantial and significant increase in the related
imports variable (Logimports), with and without
inclusion of a broad range of control variables. The
correlation is, as expected, even stronger with 5-year or
even 10-year moving averages. The instrument is thus
clearly relevant and passes weak-instruments tests. The
exogeneity of the instrument, on the other hand, can
only be assessed theoretically. We deem it highly
plausible, however, that in anticipation of a civil war,
rational military and political leaders would replenish
and expand stocks of civil war-related weapons and not
specifically purchase the types included in
Logimports_unrelated. As a test of this assumption, we
show that Logimports_unrelated is not correlated with
civil war onset when controlling for (SEM-instrumented)
Logimports (compare online appendix Section A.2.2).
The IV-probit setup then takes the following form:
Y1 ¼ 1 þ 1R1 þ γ 01Zon þ 1 ð1Þ
Y 2 ¼ 2 þ 2Y^ 1 þ γ 02Zon þ 2; ð2Þ
where Y1 measures arms imports and is instrumented by
civil war-unrelated arms imports R. Equation 1 controls
also for variables later used in the second stage probit
(Z 0on). The second stage, Equation 2, then draws on
predicted arms imports (Y^ 1) as independent variable to
explain binary conflict onset Y 2 . To our knowledge, we
are the first in proposing this instrument and therefore
go beyond the existing empirical literature when addres-
sing the endogeneity problem in this way.
Since one can never fully prove that an instrument
works, we therefore, as a second strategy, apply a simul-
taneous equations model (SEM). A number of studies
have utilized this approach to deal with simultaneity in
studying, for instance, the reciprocal relationships
between trade and interstate disputes (Keshk, Pollins &
Reuveny, 2004), democracy and war (Reuveny & Li,
2003), state capacity and intrastate conflict onset (Thies,
2010), and fiscal capacity and state failure (Thies, 2015).
The SEM takes the following general form:
Y1 ¼ 1Y 2 þ γ 01Zim þ u1 ð3Þ
Y 2 ¼ 2Y1 þ γ 02Zon þ u2; ð4Þ
where Y1 measures arms imports and Y 2 is our binary
conflict onset variable. The vectors Zim and Zon capture
the set of variables for the second stage import and
onset equations. In the first stage, both equations are
estimated using the full set of variables (Zim and Zon).
The fitted values of the two dependent variables are
then plugged into the second stage to replace the endo-
genous regressors using the specific sets of independent
variables. The continuous dependent variable equation
is then estimated by OLS and the binary dependent
variable equation is a probit model. This allows us to
simultaneously estimate the effect of weapon deliveries
on conflict onsets and the effect of onsets on arms
imports.
While technically relying on a similar exclusion restric-
tion compared to an instrumental variable approach, both
the import and the export equation are predominantly
theoretically justified. For the import equation, we use
insights from Smith & Tasiran (2005), who estimate
demand functions for arms imports, as well as results from
Pamp & Thurner (2017) who analyze the relationship
between arms and military expenditures. The second-
stage import equation is thus as follows:
LnðimportÞ ¼ 0 þ 1donset
þ γ 01
Logimports unrelated
Logmilex
Logexport
Loggdppc
Capacity
Region dummies
0
BBBBBBBB@
1
CCCCCCCCA
þ1;t
ð5Þ
Similar to the instrumental variable approach, we use
the import of unrelated weapons. This complements the
use of log military expenditures (Logmilex), which are
measured in millions of 2010 constant US dollars. One
may suspect that arms imports and military spending are
part of an accounting identity, but results by Pamp &
Thurner (2017) clearly show that this is not the case. We
also include the log of arms exports (Logexport). The
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rationale for doing so is that the international arms trade
is in large part an intra-industry trade (Thies & Peterson,
2015). In addition, we control for GDP per capita,
which should be positively related to arms imports due
to likely income effects of weapon demand (Loggdppc).
As different levels of state capacity might influence not
only onset directly but also the feasibility of arms
imports, we include the Relative Political Capacity index
(Capacity) created by Kugler & Tammen (2010).
Finally, we introduce five regional dummies (West, East-
ern europe, Latin america, Subsaharan africa, Asia) with
the reference category being the region of Northern
Africa and the Middle East. This is motivated by the fact
that some countries repeatedly have faced security-
dilemma-type situations which have led to arms races
with other countries (Richardson & Rashevsky, 1960).
Turning next to the second-stage onset equation, the
choice of covariates largely follows the seminal contribu-
tion by Fearon & Laitin (2003). We improved on some
of their variables, especially with respect to measuring
ethnic heterogeneity. Furthermore, we expanded their
specification by taking the insights of some of the more
recent studies into account:
Onset ¼ 0 þ 2Lnð dimport Þ
þ γ2
Onset last5y
Loggdppc;Logpop;Redistr
Mid ;Noncontiguous
Capacity
anoc; Instability
Excl pop
Logmountain
t ; t2; t3
0
BBBBBBBBBBBBB@
1
CCCCCCCCCCCCCA
þ 2;t
ð6Þ
We created a dummy variable (Onset_last5y), which is
1 if there was an onset during the period t  1 to t  5.
We also added the log of GDP per capita (Loggdppc) and
the log of population size (Logpop). In addition, we cre-
ated an indicator (Redistr) which captures the amount of
income redistribution by the state. It is obtained by
calculating the difference between the Gini coefficients
of market and disposable incomes. The underlying intui-
tion is that more redistribution should reduce the incen-
tives for challenging the government and thus reduce
conflict (see Buhaug, Cederman & Gleditsch, 2014).
To control for interstate conflict, we included a vari-
able (Mid ) which measures whether a country is
involved in a military interstate dispute and, if so, its
intensity (Marshall, 2016). As proposed by Fearon &
Laitin (2003), we included a dummy (Noncontiguous)
indicating whether a country is a non-contiguous state.
Moreover, we also expect the state capacity of the gov-
ernment to influence the probability of conflict onsets.
The literature has assigned an important role to the type
and stability of the political regime in a country (e.g. Fearon
& Laitin, 2003; Vreeland, 2008; Sunde & Cervellati,
2013). First, Instability is a variable that captures whether
there was a change in the Polity IV index (Marshall, Gurr
& Jaggers, 2016) of 3 or higher in the previous three years.
Second, Anoc is a dummy which indicates whether a coun-
try is an anocracy. Previous research has found countries
with these regimes to be particularly prone to intrastate
conflict. Furthermore, the share of population that is
excluded from political power and participation (Excl_pop),
be it for ethnic, religious or other reasons, and the amount
of mountainous terrain (Logmountain) in a country are
expected to increase the probability of an intrastate conflict
(e.g. Fearon & Laitin, 2003).
Finally, to deal with possible temporal dependence
(Beck, Katz & Tucker, 1998), we included linear, quad-
ratic and cubic polynomials of time (t , t2, t3) in our onset
equation, as proposed by Carter & Signorino (2010). An
overview of all our variables and data sources can be found
in Table C.1 in the Online appendix, where we also offer a
more extensive discussion on variable selections, operatio-
nalizations and methodological issues. We tested exten-
sively if our results depend on the inclusion of any one of
these variables in the import or onset equations.
Discussion of the empirical results
In the following, we present our results on the relation
between weapons imports and intrastate conflict. Table II
reports second-stage results from an instrumental variable
probit regression. The main independent variables are
arms imports measured as logs of yearly inflows (Models
1 and 2), 5-year moving averages (Models 3 and 4) and
10-year moving averages (Models 5 and 6). The results
clearly show that (instrumented) imports have a strong
and statistically significant influence on the probability of
an onset. The effect is stronger when controlling for the
conflict-inducing factors. Effects are more precisely mea-
sured when drawing on 5-year or 10-year moving
averages, which is plausible as spikes in annual imports
are evened out. Assuming the validity of the instrument,
the results give a strong empirical support for the hypo-
thesis that arms imports have a positive causal influence
on the onset probability of civil war. This effect clearly
goes beyond any effect that (latent) intratstate conflicts
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may have on decisions to import weapons. Note that
most control variables show the expected signs. However,
Logpop, Logmountain, NonContiguous and capacity are
not statistically significant. Interestingly, the share of the
excluded population (Excl_pop) has a strong, positive
effect that is highly significant. This corroborates similar
findings by Wimmer, Cederman & Min (2009), Ceder-
man, Wimmer & Min (2010) and Wimmer (2013).
Drawing on the simultaneous equation approach, a
similar picture emerges from our second stage results for
conflict onset (Table III). Arms imports have a substan-
tially and statistically very similar influence as in Models
2 and 4 of Table II. Our control variables mostly show
the expected signs, while Logmountain, Noncontigouus,
and Capacity remain statistically insignificant. Although
comparisons to the results obtained by Craft & Smal-
done (2002) and Suzuki (2007) are difficult to make due
to very different samples, variable selections and empiri-
cal approaches, we find, in general, our findings more in
line with the former.
Note that these results are average effects of a non-
linear model. As Hanmer & Kalkan (2012) have shown,
calculating marginal effects on the basis of average vari-
able values creates a weak connection with the underly-
ing hypotheses. We therefore create meaningful cases to
make causal inferences. As laid out in our theoretical
approach above, we expect imports to matter most when
a country is in a situation where conditions for a domes-
tic conflict are present, thus raising the probability of an
onset. To examine this possibility, we calculate marginal
effects for a high-risk scenario and a low-risk scenario.
We define as high-risk, countries with an anocratic
regime, a recent conflict onset, at least one bordering
country, a change in the Polity IV index of 3 or higher
Table II. Instrumental variable probit regression: Weapon imports and onsets
(1) onset (2) onset (3) onset (4) onset (5) onset (6) onset
Logimports 0.054** 0.090*
(0.012) (0.043)
Logimports_avg5 0.048** 0.083*
(0.0098) (0.034)
Logimports_avg10 0.046** 0.078*
(0.0094) (0.032)
Onset_last5y 0.63** 0.63** 0.63**
(0.095) (0.094) (0.094)
Loggdppc 0.19* 0.18** 0.17**
(0.077) (0.066) (0.063)
Logpop 0.040 0.045 0.052
(0.063) (0.054) (0.050)
Redistr 0.042** 0.044** 0.044**
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
Mid 0.15** 0.15** 0.15**
(0.050) (0.049) (0.049)
Anoc 0.26** 0.26** 0.25**
(0.082) (0.082) (0.082)
Logmountain 0.0038 0.0034 0.0033
(0.029) (0.029) (0.029)
Noncontiguous 0.20 0.18 0.17
(0.18) (0.17) (0.17)
Instability 0.35** 0.34** 0.33**
(0.093) (0.093) (0.093)
Capacity 0.100 0.092 0.091
(0.098) (0.097) (0.097)
Excl_pop 0.32* 0.32* 0.34*
(0.15) (0.15) (0.15)
N 7,219 4,645 7,070 4,645 7,070 4,645
Pseudo-R2 0.022 0.29 0.0011 0.14 0.000092 0.12
Instrumental variable probit regression (two-step procedure), Logimports (Logimports avg5) instrumented by Logimports (Logimports avg5) of
civil war-unrelated major conventional weapons. Standard errors in parentheses. Constant and coefficients for t, t2 and t3 not shown.
yp < 0.10; *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01.
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in the previous three years, an interstate conflict value of
4 and values for mountainous terrain and share of
excluded population that put a country in the 90th per-
centile of the sample and a low amount of income redis-
tribution, state capacity and GDP per capita (10th
percentile of the sample). The reverse of these values
defines low-risk.10 For further illustrative purposes, we also
include the case of Angola, a country that has experienced a
number of civil war onsets between 1975 and 2002. Look-
ing at the mean values for 1973–2013, Angola resembles
the high-risk case for most independent variables.
As column 1 in Table IV shows, arms imports increase
onset probability in the high-risk scenario and the Angolan
case. The effect is extremely small in the low-risk case. In
quantitative terms, assuming the sample average for arms
imports and transforming log-values back intoTIVs,we find
that an increase in arms imports by2.7millionTIVraises the
onset probability by 2:3 percentage points under the high-
risk scenario, whereas the marginal effects for Angola are
about 1:3 percentage points. To put this into perspective,
the sample mean for arms imports is 195:45 million TIV,
which is somewhat lower than civil war-torn Angola’s aver-
age of 267:81 million TIVs. Note that arms imports can
change quite strongly over time – upward or downward
movements by several hundred million TIVs are not rare.
In 1987, for instance, imports to Angola increased by almost
500 million TIVs. When comparing a situation with no
imports to the case with the sample maximum of imports,
we find that for the high-risk case the predicted probability
of conflict onset increases from 59% to 80% (see Figure 1).
In the low-risk case, on the other hand, the marginal effects
aremuch smaller. A change from zero tomaximum imports
increases onset probability from 0:09% to 0:6%. This find-
ing emphasizes the fact that arms imports to countries in
which conditions for civil conflict are not present have
almost no impact on onset probability. In other words, arms
imports in and of themselves do not cause intrastate con-
flicts. Note that the marginal effects of the 5- and 10-year
backward averages of arms imports are almost identical.
With respect to the second stage estimations for the
import equation,we provide the results and amore detailed
discussion in Online appendix Table A.1. At this point, a
Table IV. Marginal effects of arms imports on conflict onset in
different scenarios.
Logimports Logimports avg5 Logimports avg10
High-risk 0.02279
(0.00963)
0.0222
(0.0094)
0.02194
(0.00991)
Low-risk 0.00031 0.00030 0.00030
(0.00016) (0.00016) (0.00016)
Angola 0.01343 0.01265 0.01227
(0.00595) (0.00557) (0.00576)
Marginal effects with standard errors in parentheses. High-risk sce-
nario: Onset_last5y ¼ 1, Anoc ¼ 1, Instability ¼ 1, Noncontiguous ¼
0, Logmountain¼ 3.985273, Exclpop¼ 0.458, Redistr¼ 0.9306297,
Capacity¼ 0.478, Loggdppc¼ 11.33362,Mid¼ 4, all other variables
¼mean. Low-risk scenario: Onset_last5y¼ 0, Anoc¼ 0, Instability¼
0, Noncontiguous ¼ 1, Logmountain ¼ 0, Exclpop ¼ 0, Redistr ¼
16.62126, Capacity ¼ 1.495, Loggdppc ¼ 14.60336, Mid ¼ 0, all
other variables¼mean. Angola:Onset_Last5y¼ 0.5, Anoc¼ 0.5897,
Instability ¼ 0.111, Noncontiguous ¼ 1, Logmountain ¼ 2.370244,
Exclpop ¼ 0.62, Redistr ¼ 2.805, Capacity ¼ 1.782, Loggdppc ¼
12.60593, Mid ¼ 0, all other variables ¼ mean.
Table III. Second stage results of SEM: Onsets
(1)
onset
(2)
onset
(3)
onset
Logimports 0.075*
(0.030)
Logimports_avg5 0.072*
(0.029)
Logimports_avg10 0.064*
(0.028)
Onset_last5y 0.66** 0.66** 0.66**
(0.10) (0.10) (0.10)
Loggdppc 0.20** 0.20** 0.18**
(0.066) (0.064) (0.062)
Logpop 0.11* 0.11* 0.12**
(0.049) (0.049) (0.048)
Redistr 0.042** 0.043** 0.043**
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Mid 0.22** 0.22** 0.22**
(0.059) (0.059) (0.059)
Anoc 0.21* 0.20* 0.19*
(0.092) (0.091) (0.091)
Logmountain 0.029 0.029 0.029
(0.033) (0.033) (0.033)
Noncontiguous 0.15 0.14 0.12
(0.19) (0.19) (0.19)
Instability 0.31** 0.29** 0.28**
(0.10) (0.10) (0.10)
Capacity 0.035 0.019 0.014
(0.11) (0.11) (0.11)
Excl_pop 0.34* 0.34y 0.35*
(0.17) (0.17) (0.17)
N 3,998 3,998 3,998
Pseudo-R2 0.18 0.18 0.18
Simultaneous equations model according to Equations 5 and 6. Stan-
dard errors in parentheses. Constant and coefficients for t, t2 and t3
not shown.
yp < 0.10; *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01.
10 The low-risk values correspond, for example, to Denmark 1991–
2013.
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brief summary shall suffice given that our focus is on con-
flict onsets. What the estimations for the import equation
clearly show is that anticipation effects are sizable. Conflict
onset in year t significantly increases the amount of weap-
ons imports, thus underlining the simultaneity of imports
and conflicts. Ignoring this endogeneity would therefore
lead to highly biased inferences.
We are now in a position to relate our empirical
findings to our theoretical expectations. The results show
that there is indeed a positive, causal effect of arms
imports on the probability of violent conflict onsets.
Given our estimation strategies, we can rule out that this
is simply due to a conflict anticipation effect. In line with
our theoretical thinking, weapon inflows strongly influ-
ence conflict probability in a high-risk scenario, that is,
in a situation where other conditions make conflict more
likely. In the low-risk case, however, all the marginal
effects remained extremely small. These results suggest
that arms inflows to countries where conflict-inducing
conditions are present have an escalating effect and do
not discourage potential challengers. In these situations
effective deterrence does not seem to be taking place.
Rather, conflict initiation becomes more likely. Whether
this is due to pre-emptive motives by the government or
rebel groups is beyond the scope of our analysis, however.
Robustness and validity of the instruments
We tested the robustness of our models in a number of
ways. We applied alternative estimators (two-stage least
squares), checked results for different assumptions on
standard errors, employed alternative definitions for the
main dependent variable (Logimports), and for the con-
flict onset variable. Overall, we can confirm all of our
conclusions. The robustness tests are summarized in
more detail in the Online appendix, which also reports
tests on the exogeneity assumption of the IV- and SEM-
model. First of all, we tested whether Logimports_unre-
lated has an independent influence on civil war onset in a
SEM model that excludes Logimports_unrelated in the
Zim vector. While all other coefficients, and notably our
arms imports coefficient, change only marginally, unre-
lated weapons show neither a substantive nor a statistical
relation with conflict onset (see Table A.4). Secondly, for
the SEM, we allowed variables only contained in Zim=on
and most susceptible to potential endogeneity concerns
to influence both the import and the onset equation.
Again, our conclusions hold, which makes us confident
that both approaches provide internally valid results for
the effect of arms imports on conflict onset.
Summary and conclusions
This article systematically analyzed the relationship
between the import of major conventional weapons and
the onset of intrastate conflict. We focused on weapon
transfers to governments as primary recipients of MCWs.
Our point of departure was the conceptual and econo-
metric challenge that governments may import arms in
anticipating a future conflict outbreak, which would mean
that a positive relationship between arms and civil war
onset does not imply causation. This inherent endogene-
ity is the key problem when empirically exploring the
relationship between weapons and conflicts. Previous
studies have not appropriately dealt with this issue.
Based on theoretical ideas developed initially in the
interstate war literature, we first explored several theore-
tical mechanisms relating imports to conflicts. We
argued that the availability of arms may increase govern-
ments, willingness to use them in order to resolve a
conflict by violent means. We showed that some crisis
bargaining models suggest that arms imports could func-
tion as a deterrent against potential challengers. How-
ever, we maintained that imports could also lead to
escalation and thus conflict due to predatory incentives
by governments or pre-emptive motives by rebels.
Hence, arms inflows affect the actors’ decision to fight
because they change the underlying distribution of mil-
itary capabilities and exacerbate commitment problems.
Finally, past arms imports may have reduced investment
in state capacities, thus reducing states’ abilities to resolve
conflicts peacefully. We therefore expected that when
controlling properly for the inherent endogeneity, we
Figure 1. Predicted probabilities for yearly arms imports in
high-risk and low-risk scenarios
The x-axis shows the instrumented values of yearly arms imports (in logs).
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would still find a positive effect on intrastate conflict
onsets.
Testing our theoretical expectations, we found that
increases in imports do indeed increase the probability
of an intrastate conflict. This suggests that they fuel
tensions in a latent conflict and make its outbreak more
probable. This effect is quite substantial, but only in
high-risk cases, that is, in situations where conflict-
inducing conditions are present. In other words, for arms
to have a destabilizing effect, there must be issues of
contention between the government and other societal
groups. Our results indicate that in such situations, arms
imports are not an effective deterrent for governments
against potential challengers. From a policy perspective,
we would therefore caution against the idea of using
weapon exports as a means of stabilizing a country facing
a domestic conflict. Based on our results, escalation and
violent conflict become more likely. However, note that
our econometric approach focuses on the effect of
changes in civil war-related weapon imports induced
by our instruments – this local average treatment effect
does not necessarily imply similar consequences for var-
iation induced in arms imports through other factors.
Particularly, we show that government imports due to
motives unrelated to civil war onset make outbreaks
more likely. Future research could study whether arms
imported with the explicit aim of deterring domestic
rivals can achieve this goal.
While we are quite confident in the robustness of our
results, we are acutely aware that this can only be the
beginning of our research. We only looked at major
conventional weapons, which begs the question of what
role small arms and light weapons could play. We also
limited ourselves to conflict onsets, thus ignoring the
effect of weapon deliveries on ongoing conflicts. Do they
prolong or shorten them? Do they intensify them, lead-
ing to more deaths? Providing answers to these questions
would bring us a step closer to fully understanding the
role of the international arms trade in intrastate conflicts.
Replication data
The dataset, codebook, and do-files for the empirical analy-
sis in this article, as well as the Online appendix, can be
found at http://www.prio.org/jpr/datasets. All analyses
were conducted using Stata 14.2.
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